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Introduction: Nascent Partners 
 
 In today’s world there exist numerous countries working together in order to pursue 
common goals.  Some countries form formal coalitions, like the EU or NATO, while others 
operate within a looser, less overt system.  Two countries beginning to show signs of this latter 
form of cooperation are China and Iran.  Both countries share a number of key interests, and 
together, may be capable of achieving them. 
 Chinese-Iranian cooperation is important for numerous reasons, firstly because it presents 
implications for controlling nuclear proliferation.  It is no secret that Iran is actively pursuing 
nuclear weapons, and in this context China could play a key role in international efforts to stop 
Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  With ties to both the West and Iran, China is in the rare 
position of wielding influence over both sides of the Iranian nuclear dilemma.  While western 
states view Iranian development of nuclear weapons as something that is dangerous and which 
must be prevented, it is unclear whether or not China shares this view.  As a veto-wielding 
member of the Security Council, deepening Chinese-Iranian relations thus could complicate the 
control of nuclear weapons proliferation, as China could undermine US-led initiatives to derail 
Tehran’s nuclear program.   
 Sino-Iranian cooperation also presents implications for the global energy supply.  Iran, 
although rich in natural gas and oil deposits, has seen relatively little exploitation of its energy 
resources. While many countries are reluctant to deal with Iran’s energy sector due to US 
discouragement, China appears to be bucking this trend. Recent developments show Chinese oil 
companies engaging in business with Iranian oil companies, and indicate Chinese interests in 
securing Iranian oil. As the world’s fastest growing economy, China needs to secure sufficient 
energy resources to help fuel its astronomical rate of development.  In search of a secure energy 
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source, China could partner with Iran to alleviate the worry of future energy supply shortages.  
Chinese-Iranian cooperation could thus potentially impact the global energy supply, as resulting 
from this collaborative effort to develop Iran’s oil industry, China may block other nations from 
gaining access to this oil in the future. 
 China’s role in the world order could also be influenced by deepening its ties with Iran.  
Following the financial crisis of 2008, China’s status as a major political power was cemented, 
and as a result changes in Chinese behavior have become apparent.  China has become more 
confident, and has begun to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy as a result.  China is 
currently faced with a US presence in its own region, with the US Navy patrolling the waters of 
the western Pacific.  Eager to diminish US influence in the East Asia region, China appears to be 
searching for ways to cut US power across the globe.  Iran could potentially aid China on this 
quest.  Through resisting US initiatives to isolate and weaken Iran, China can undercut the US’s 
ability to dominate the Middle East.  Could China be hoping a strengthened Iran is enough to 
distract the US away from East Asia?   
 The Middle Eastern balance of power could also be affected by deepened Chinese-Iranian 
ties.  Iran has been the target of US discrimination ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and 
as such has struggled economically, and politically.  Located between Afghanistan and Iraq, two 
US-occupied countries, Iran fears it is next on the short list of countries that will face a US 
invasion.  China, meanwhile, has to potential to undermine western efforts to suffocate Iranian 
growth.  Through aiding it to prosper, China could help establish Iran as a great power in the 
Middle East, and disrupt the strategic balance of power which currently exists in the region. 
 Although they share a number of common interests, cooperation between China and Iran 
is a complicated issue.  As Iran is viewed largely as a rogue state by the international 
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community, countries that demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with it inevitably face 
international scrutiny.  China in the past has been forced to choose between its mutual interests 
with Iran and those with other countries, such as the US.  The contemporary political landscape 
has seen China gain a considerable amount of leverage over the US, and in turn it is able to be 
more aggressive in its pursuit of its foreign policy goals and can resist US coercion more 
effectively. Its cooperation with Iran has increased as a result of this development.  The key to a 
number of its most pressing interests, Iran could be a critical ally in China’s future foreign 
policy. 
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Chapter I: The Iranian Nuclear Dilemma 
 
 One of the most complicated and critical current international political issues is the 
Iranian nuclear dilemma.  The Iranian government is determined to develop nuclear weapons 
technology, which, should it occur, could have far reaching effects impacting not only Middle 
Eastern countries, but nations all across the globe.  This complicates Iranian relations with other 
countries, as many are hesitant to support a regime that could be seen as attempting to overturn 
the balance of power in one of the world’s most volatile regions. 
 
The Iranian Nuclear Saga 
The Iranian nuclear program has undergone major developments in recent years, even 
while the country has been punished with numerous rounds of UN sanctions.  Although not yet 
believed to be in possession of a nuclear bomb, Iran has never been as close to obtaining one as it 
is now, nearing “nuclear breakout capability.”1  Once a nuclear breakout capability is reached, a 
bomb could feasibly be constructed in as little as “a few months”2.  Although the official stance 
of the Iranian government regarding its nuclear program remains that it is intended solely for 
“peaceful”3 purposes in order to “diversify its energy portfolio,”4 its behavior surrounding the 
program indicates otherwise.  In spite of UN mandates ordering it stop, Iran has “continued its 
uranium enrichment operations,”5
                                                 
1 “Iran May Achieve Capability to Make a Nuclear Weapon in 2009,” Council on Foreign Relations , 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18570/iran_may_achieve_capability_to_make_a_nuclear_weapon_in_2009.html 
 and, after US intelligence penetrated Iranian computer 
2 “Iran May Achieve Capability to Make a Nuclear Weapon in 2009,” Council on Foreign Relations , 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18570/iran_may_achieve_capability_to_make_a_nuclear_weapon_in_2009.html 
3 “Ambassador: Iran’s Nuclear Program Peaceful,” IRNA, 30 September 2009 
4 Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/#p2 
5 “UN Sanctions Against Iran,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8273932.stm 
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networks, evidence that “Iran sought to design a nuclear weapon”6 surfaced.  Further, in 
September 2009 the US, Britain, and France revealed that there existed a “multiyear Iranian 
effort (…) to build a secret uranium enrichment plant deep inside a mountain.”7  Adding to the 
evidence that this plant was weapons focused, and not for civilian nuclear technology, are its 
“size, secrecy, and location on a Revolutionary Guards base.”8  While it is too small to enrich 
sufficient amounts of fuel for “commercial use”9 it is adequate to make weapons.  Its location on 
a military installation, meanwhile, only increases suspicions surrounding its existence.  This 
“serial deception of many years,”10 as described by Prime Minister Gordon Brown of England, is 
the main reason that the Iranian nuclear program is looked upon with such suspicion.  Although 
Iran maintains that its activities are “completely legal,”11
 The international community has so far been largely united against Iran, with a few 
countries, namely Russia and China, voicing opposition at times towards the tactics being 
employed to deter Iran’s quest for nuclear capabilities.  The main deterrent used is the imposition 
of economic sanctions on Iran through the UN.  The first round of sanctions was imposed in 
December of 2006, when Iran failed “to halt uranium enrichment”
 its continued march towards uranium 
enrichment remains a source of international concern.   
12
                                                 
6 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York 
Times, 26 September 2009 
 after the IAEA ordered it to 
do so.  The sanctions blocked “the import or export of sensitive nuclear materiel and equipment 
and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive 
7 Sanger and Board, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York Times, 26 September 
2009  
8 Sanger and Board, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York Times, 26 September 
2009 
9 Sanger and Board, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York Times, 26 September 
2009  
10 Sanger and Board, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York Times, 26 September 
2009  
11 Sanger and Board, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear ‘Deception,’” The New York Times, 26 September 
2009  
12 “UN Passes Iran Sanctions,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6205295.stm 
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nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.”13  Then, in March 
2007, after the first round of sanctions was ineffective, more largely financial sanctions were 
imposed, in the hopes that they would “leave Tehran more isolated,”14 and stifle financial 
support for the nuclear program.  Finally, after previous sanctions were yet again unsuccessful, 
the UN imposed a final round in 2008, but also came to “the end of the line on new initiatives 
that will move the Iranians significantly.”15  The sanctions were noticeably watered down, 
reflecting both events to be discussed in Chapter III, and also mounting international skepticism 
over their effectiveness16
Diplomatic efforts apart from sanctions have also failed to contain Iran’s nuclear 
program.  In October of 2009, after the five members of the UN Security Council and Germany 
held negotiations with Iran attempting to solve the issue by proposing that a third party enrich 
uranium on Iran’s behalf, Iran rejected the offer.
.  The skepticism over their effectiveness was warranted, as Iran has yet 
to halt its uranium enrichment program. 
17  Iran countered with its “proposing instead 
that its uranium be enriched on Iranian soil by a third country, under IAEA supervision,”18 which 
was countered with another US proposal, which, again, Iran ultimately rejected.  In February of 
2010, Iran continued to directly defy the international community and announced its “plan to 
begin enriching its [uranium] stockpile to 20-percent purity.”19
                                                 
13 “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting 
Resolution 1737,” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm 
  This worries western nations 
since this ability would put Iran in “a position to produce weapons-grade uranium in a 
14 Thom Shanker, “Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions,” The New York Times, 25 March 2007 
15 Robin Wright and John Lynch, “UN Imposes New Sanctions on Iran,” The Washington Post, 4 March 2008 
16 Wright and Lynch, “UN Imposes New Sanctions on Iran,” The Washington Post, 4 March 2008 
17 “US Pushes for Answers Over Iran Nuclear Counter-offer,” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/30/iran.nuclear/index.html#cnnSTCText 
18 US Pushes for Answers Over Iran Nuclear Counter-offer,” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/30/iran.nuclear/index.html#cnnSTCText 
19 Alan Cowell and Thom Shanker, “Iran Nuclear Plans Start New Calls for Sanctions,” The New York Times, 8 
February 2010 
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comparatively short time.”20
 
  Iran is closer than ever before to a nuclear warhead, and as such, 
the potential consequences of such a development more salient than ever. 
Effects of Sanctions 
 As Iran is still marching towards developing nuclear capabilities, it is clear that UN 
sanctions have been unsuccessful in derailing the Iranian nuclear program.  The main cause of 
this impotency derives from the sectors of the Iranian economy which have been targeted by the 
punitive measures of the Security Council.  The first round of sanctions, in April 2006, 
demanded that all countries “freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources 
owned or controlled by officials and companies in the country's nuclear and missile programs.”21  
The next round, imposed in March of 2007, focused on “constraining Iranian arms exports, the 
state-owned Bank Sepah — already under Treasury Department sanctions — and the 
Revolutionary Guard Corps,”22 which represented a slight broadening of the scope of the 
sanctions.  The final round imposed in March of 2008 merely “increased travel and financial 
curbs on individuals” connected to the Iranian nuclear program,23
 The effects of sanctions on Iran have been acute.  One long term side effect sanctions 
may have on Iran is on its energy sector,
 which demonstrated the 
growing international skepticism of the effectiveness of the sanctions, and in turn the reluctance 
to broaden their scope further.   
24
                                                 
20 Cowell and Shanker, “Iran Nuclear Plans Start New Calls for Sanctions,” The New York Times, 8 February 2010 
 which relies on loans and investment from foreign oil 
companies, most of whom are vulnerable to US pressure, and have backed out of the Iranian oil 
21 “UN Passes Resolution on Iran Sanctions,” Xinhua, 24 December 2006 
22 Shanker, “Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions,” The New York Times, 25 March 2007 
23 “Iran Sanctions: The Facts,” Reuters, 13 October 2009 
24 “Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,” Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
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industry.  Sanctions have thus helped to stifle the development of Iran’s oil refining capabilities.  
Nonetheless, the sanctions have had little to no effect on Iran’s actual nuclear program.  As 
sanctions have remained closely targeted towards Iran’s financial sector, the “primary effect of 
the squeeze on Iranian banks has been a lack of credit, especially for imports.”25  Several 
loopholes to the sanctions exist, and much of “Iran’s banking business has been shifted to 
smaller boutique banks in Asia without American business,”26 and in turn without fear of a 
negative American reaction.  Moreover, the segment of the Iranian population the sanctions have 
been affecting most are private business owners, who are also those most “likely to oppose the 
[current Iranian] regime,”27 which could pose a problem for the US if the sanctions “breed anti-
Washington resentment”28
The sanctions have been ineffective in derailing the Iranian nuclear program because they 
are too narrow in scope to effect change in the Iranian government.  Even the “most targeted 
sanctions will be unlikely to keep Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold,”
 among this traditionally pro-west sector of the Iranian population.  
This western-leaning segment of the Iranian population is also largely ignored by the 
government, which only adds to the indifference the Iranian regime feels towards the sanctions. 
29
                                                 
25 “Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,” Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
 as Iran can 
literally continue to move its nuclear program further underground with each successive round of 
sanctions.  Iran has successfully evaded any dire consequences for continuing its nuclear 
program in the face of sanctions, since the sanctions punish nothing more than the nuclear 
program itself.  Thus, by developing more advanced methods of concealing the program, and 
26 “Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,”  Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
27 “Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,”  Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
28 “Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,” Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
29 Sanctioning Iran: Current Impact, Future Prospects,” Brookings, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1216_iran.aspx 
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continuing to bait and switch the international community, Iran has sustained minimal economic 
damage as a product of the sanctions.  
 
The Regional Leader Challenged: Consequences for Israel 
As Iran seems unstoppable on its march towards joining the nuclear club, the 
consequences of such a development must be considered carefully.  Israel would be the country 
most directly affected by a nuclear Iran.  Israel believes a nuclear Iran poses an “existential 
threat”30  due to statements made by current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 31 and it 
fears that a nuclear Iran will attempt to “drive them out of Palestine or place them under Muslim 
rule in a unitary state”32 and destroy it.  Nuclear weapons, then, are essential to Israel’s own 
national security, as its “small population, and few means of protecting itself”33 give it few other 
recourses.  If another Middle Eastern state were to match Israeli capabilities, Israeli security and 
power would be severely jeopardized, and the Israeli nuclear program would have to increase its 
output of weaponry.  Israel also fears that Iran could provide Hezbollah or the Palestinians with34
                                                 
30 Dalie Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehry, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reaction of Neighbors,” 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779310491&fulltext=713240928 
 
nuclear or other weapons.  Iran has supported Hezbollah in the past, and although Iran may not 
directly supply these terrorist groups with weapons, these groups may feel more secure, and 
under the protection of a nuclear Iran, become more brazen and aggressive against Israel.   
31 “Iranian Leader: Wipe Out Israel,” 27 October 2005, edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/26/ahmadinejad/ 
32 Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 69, 15 
33 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 17 
34 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 16 
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If Iran develops nuclear capabilities, Israel would be forced to be more open about its 
status as a nuclear power.  Although it “has never confirmed or denied its nuclear status”35 in an 
attempt to avoid being the “first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East,”36 its 
status as a nuclear power is a public fact.  Thus, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Israel might 
believe that it would be unable to “have a credible second-strike capability without testing a 
nuclear warhead,”37 the defense necessary to protect itself from an Iranian nuclear strike.  Israel 
is extremely concerned with maintaining its image as a regional “superpower that can’t be 
defeated,”38 due to the fact that it is this image, however true or not, which constitutes a large 
portion of Israel’s security from its neighbors.  Israelis worry that a nuclear Iran could “challenge 
the image of Israel’s military superiority,”39
 
 and thus increase the threat level of other countries 
and terrorist organizations to its national security.   
Regional Ripple Effect 
The second potential consequence of the Iranian bomb is that a “domino style arms race 
in the region”40 may develop.  It is likely that other Middle Eastern countries would not stand by 
as Iran and Israel build up their own nuclear stores.  Saudi Arabia, for example, would likely 
begin its “own indigenous nuclear programmes.”41
                                                 
35 “Israel: Nuclear Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html 
  Firstly, fearful that nuclear weapons could 
36 “Israel: Nuclear Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html 
37 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 18 
38 Willem van Kemenade, Iran’s Cooperation with China and the West, (Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael,’: The Hague, November 2009), 64 
39 Kemenade, Iran’s Cooperation with China and the West, 64 
40 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, xi 
41 Kaye and Wehry, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors,” 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779310491&fulltext=713240928 
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embolden Iran to “aggressively intervene in the broader region,”42 the Saudi government would 
likely counter Iran in order to ensure its own security.  Moreover, the threat of the “Shiite 
Crescent,” the dominance of Shiite Muslims—of which Iran’s population constitutes the 
majority—in the Middle East, would increase, and other Sunni dominated countries, such as 
Jordan, would likely follow the Saudi lead in balancing against Iran, perhaps through initiating 
its own nuclear program, or allying with other nations in the region.  Stronger Shiite 
governments, Sunni states feel, may “weaken the ability of Sunni Arabs to defend themselves.”43  
Ever since the US invaded Iraq and deposed Sadaam Hussein, the balance of power in the 
Middle East has changed completely.  Arab states fear that Iraq, a country previously ruled by a 
Sunni government, has the potential to be ruled by “an inexperienced, religiously volatile group 
of religious extremists and clerics who will tie Baghdad closely to Tehran.”44  An Iranian-Iraqi 
alliance could be quite powerful in the region, and for this reason Arab states perceive a nuclear 
Iran as a national security threat on the one hand, but also as a threat to the influence they have in 
their own region.  They share the worry with the US that Tehran has ambitions to “become the 
dominant military power in the Persian Gulf and across the broader Middle East.”45  Resulting 
from this fear, the US has openly discussed the possibility of erecting a “"defense umbrella" over 
the Middle East if Tehran continues its nuclear program.”46
                                                 
42 Kaye and Wehry, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors,” 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779310491&fulltext=713240928 
  Never before has the US considered 
such a strategy in the Middle East, and the fact its implementation is currently being considered 
demonstrates the urgency Arab states feel regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 
43 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 21 
44 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 20 
45 Shanker, “Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions,” The New York Times, 25 March 2007 
46 Paul Richter, “U.S. May Put Up ‘Defense Umbrella’ Over Mideast,” The Los Angeles Times, 23 July 2009 
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Internal instability is another feared consequence of many Arab state’s rulers.  Alliances 
between Shiite dominated Iraq and Iran aside, many states, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrain, whose populations contain a high percentage of Shiite Muslims,47 fear domestic 
consequences as well.  Shiite clerics, such as Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who are extremely popular 
and influential among Shiite Muslims across the Middle East,48
 
 could challenge the control these 
autocratic governments have over their populations.  A nuclear Iran could not only embolden 
Iran politically, but also the Shiite clerics who reside there.  Subversion of Shiite Arabs by the 
newly empowered clerics could add domestic instability to the international instability a nuclear 
Iran may incur. 
Implications for the US and NATO 
The US also has interests in preventing Iran from going nuclear.  First is the US fear that 
Iran could possibly become emboldened by the possession of a nuclear weapon and act more 
aggressively in the region.  Resulting from its new status as a nuclear state, an “assertive Iran 
could demand that U.S. bases in the region be closed, or it could threaten to resume its efforts to 
export the revolution”49 as it did following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979.  Secondly, a 
confident Iran could allow it to pursue riskier policies, and become more involved in Iraq.  With 
the US still bogged down in Baghdad, if Iran wanted to cause trouble for the US, it could begin 
“Destabilizing Iraq by Inducing the Shi’a to Rise Up,”50
                                                 
47 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 21 
 and make an already difficult situation 
in Iraq much worse.  Although US fears over a nuclear Iran deal mainly with the fact that a 
48 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 21 
49 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, 9 
50 Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, “A Preemptive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences,” 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 12 August 2004, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040812.htm 
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nuclear Iran could hedge against US dominance in the region, they also consider the implications 
for Israel. One of the US’s strongest allies, and the only state in the region with nuclear 
capabilities, any threat to Israel—as a nuclear Iran could be—would pose a threat to the US as 
well. 
Another major concern for the US, however, focuses not on potential Iranian use of the 
bomb, but that should Iran obtain WMD’s it may proliferate them to third party organizations.  
National security consultant Gregory Giles discussed in a congressional hearing in 2005 the 
threat that Iran could engage in an “A.Q. Khan-like network supplying WMD on the black 
market for terrorist groups,”51 and thus enable third party terrorist groups to carry out a nuclear 
attack.  Although the chances of Iran proliferating nuclear weapons to terrorist groups are slim 
for numerous reasons, including the fact that these groups could use them against Iran itself, 
what matters most is that it is unclear “whether the regime in Tehran could reliably control”52
Other states with interests in keeping Iran from getting the bomb are the EU-3: Germany, 
the UK, and France.  In the past, these powers have engaged in unsuccessful talks with Iran in an 
effort to halt the progress of its nuclear program, indicating their interests in diffusing the 
situation before Iran gets the bomb.  The concerns of these countries are similar to US fears that 
the regional instability that may follow Iran going nuclear could disrupt the strategic balance of 
power in existence in the Middle East.  Nevertheless, while the US seems to be more focused on 
 the 
nuclear technology it develops, and the chances of leaks of information seem to be great. As 
more people learn the secrets to nuclear technology, more people can accidentally let such 
secrets slip. 
                                                 
51 US Congress, Committee on Homeland Security, WMD Terrorism and Proliferent States, 109th Congress, 1st 
Session, 8 September 2005,  http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:31097.wais on 10/31/09 
52 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, xiv 
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punishing Iran in an effort to halt the program, the EU is focusing on rewarding Iran should it 
voluntarily give up its nuclear aspirations.  Although all three countries have outspokenly 
supported sanctions since they began in 2007, they focus more on carrots than sticks.  The 
official EU stance on Iran recognizes that there exists “great potential for deeper relations 
between Iran and the EU,”53 such as in the fields of “science & technology, energy, transport, 
environment, drugs control, asylum and migration, education and culture.”54
 
  Using these 
potential areas of cooperation, which would be of benefit to Iran’s economy, as carrots, the EU 
wants to highlight the benefits Iran would reap from stopping its development of nuclear 
technologies. 
Global Energy Supply in Peril? 
With increased tensions in the Middle East, another international concern would be 
energy security.  Heightened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two main countries 
straddling the Persian Gulf, could put international oil trade at risk.  As roughly “40 percent of 
all seaborne traded oil”55 in the world passes through the Persian Gulf, not only would oil prices 
suddenly spike, but petroleum supplies worldwide could be put in extreme peril should the flow 
of oil be cut off.  Iran is aware of this international concern, as “Explicit threats to the Strait are a 
key component”56
                                                 
53 “European Union and Iran,” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/index_en.htm 
 of its foreign policy.  The credibility of such threats is unclear, nonetheless, as 
the Iranian navy consists mostly of “small suicide boats, mobile antiship cruise missiles, and 
54 “Brief History of Relations between EU and Iran,” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/relations_en.htm 
55 “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html 
56 Eugene Gholz, “Why Iran Can’t Cut Off Your Oil,” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/12/the_strait_dope 
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sophisticated sea mines,”57 which all are ineffective in disabling the enormous oil tankers which 
pass through the Strait.  The conventional wisdom dictating western nations’ assessment of 
Iranian threats to interfere with the flow of oil through the Strait “may be wrong,”58  since “Iran 
would find it so difficult, if not impossible, to close the strait.”59
The best example of previous US intervention in maintaining the security of the Persian 
Gulf, ironically, was in 1984-7, when Iran was bogged down in the Iran-Iraq war.  By the 
midpoint of this long and bloody war, the conflict had evolved into a war on each country’s 
imports and exports.  Iraqi and Iranian missiles not only destroyed Iranian and Iraqi oil tankers, 
but also “civilian commercial shipping”
  While some thus consider the 
actual threats to the global energy supply to be overblown, the fact remains that forcibly 
maintaining the Strait open would be a costly endeavor requiring the dedication of US military 
resources and Navy personnel, and would also likely cause a spike in oil prices.  In this regard, 
threats to the Strait must be taken seriously, as the consequences, although possibly not as dire as 
widely believed, would be nonetheless costly. 
60 headed for ports on the Gulf.  The US, growing weary 
of the effects on trade, began reflagging61
                                                 
57 Gholz, “Why Iran Can’t Cut Off Your Oil,” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/12/the_strait_dope 
 Kuwaiti ships with US flags, and escorted them 
through the strait with the US Navy, in order to afford at least one source of oil some protection.  
US presence in the gulf, and the threat of further US military intervention certainly helped to end 
the tanker war between Iran and Iraq.  Although the US maintained official neutrality during the 
conflict, it is clear that the “American government consistently tilted in favor of Iraq throughout 
58 Gholz, “Why Iran Can’t Cut Off Your Oil,” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/12/the_strait_dope 
59 Gholz, “Why Iran Can’t Cut Off Your Oil,” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/12/the_strait_dope 
60 “Iran Iraq War,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm# 
61 “The Tanker War, 1984-87,” http://countrystudies.us/iraq/105.htm 
 16 
the war,”62 by leaking information to the Iraqis63 and encouraging “nonneutral practices by 
numerous Middle Eastern countries against Iran.”64
 
  If conflict were to arise between Saudi 
Arabia, an ally of the US, and Iran, a member of the so deemed ‘Axis of Evil,’ it is likely that the 
US would react even stronger, and possibly intervene militarily on behalf of Saudi Arabia.  
Moreover, the US has become much more aggressive when it comes to energy security since the 
era of the Iran Iraq War, best displayed in Operation Desert Storm. 
Deep Seeded Iranian Nuclear Aspirations 
From the Iranian point of view, however, the obtainment of a nuclear bomb would serve 
a number of important national interests.  First, the bomb would greatly increase Iran’s security.  
Scott Sagan outlines three general principles which can help explain why states pursue nuclear 
weapons.  One of which is “the security model, according to which states build nuclear weapons 
to increase national security against foreign threats.”65  Iran faces numerous clear conventional 
and nuclear threats against which it must protect itself.  It is surrounded by nuclear states in the 
region, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, and not to mention the US.  Iran feels “strategically 
isolated and needs self-sufficiency to defend itself in the event of attack.”66
                                                 
62 Francis A. Boyle, “International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War,” 
Mercer Law Review, Winter 1992, Vol. 43, 537   
  Iran is at the mercy 
of its neighbors, who all possess more advanced military technologies, and can exert more 
pressure on the Iranian state.  A nuclear weapon would help to alleviate this pressure, and allow 
Iran to act more assertively in its region, and protect its own interests—like its national 
security— more effectively. 
63 Boyle, “International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War,” 538 
64 Boyle, “International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War,” 545 
65 Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996-97, 
55 
66 Yaphe and Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, McNair Paper 69, xi 
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Iranian security has previously suffered because of its out of date military technology, 
most notably during the Iran Iraq War. Iran was the victim of numerous WMD attacks, in 
particular chemical and biological weapons such as mustard gas, and the nerve agent tabun.67  
The fatalities and humiliation endured by Iran’s first experience with chemical weapons in the 
conflict with Iraq is “a prime motivator in developing Iran’s WMD programs and conventional 
capabilities.”68  Following the obvious and repeated Iraqi use of chemical weapons, Iran pleaded 
with the international community to condemn Iraq for its use of chemical weapons, but it was 
met with silence.  This “failure of the international community to condemn Iraq for its CW 
[chemical weapon] use (…) demonstrated the indifference—if not outright hostility of the 
international community—towards Iran,”69 and signaled to Iranian leaders that “global powers 
were more likely to reward violations of international law than”70 enforce them.  In part due to 
this past experience, Iran feels that “conventional weapons would probably not suffice to ensure 
their national security and deter an attack.”71
Iran believes that nuclear weapons became all but essential to its security after the US 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003.  Iran, more so than ever, feels it needs an 
effective deterrent to ensure its sovereignty.  The US is the most technologically advanced and 
powerful military force on the planet today, and Iran is sandwiched between two countries 
currently occupied by it.  Furthermore, Iran’s long coastline along the Persian Gulf leaves it 
vulnerable to attacks launched from US aircraft carriers stationed in the gulf.  Indeed, in the past 
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the US has increased the amount of aircraft carriers it positions in the gulf “as a reminder”72
A second factor driving Iran’s quest for a nuclear bomb are domestic circumstances.  For 
Iran, nuclear power has developed into a prestige piece, a “matter of national pride, where the 
population is largely united behind the regime.”
 to 
Iran of this vulnerability.  If Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, it would be safer from these 
foreign attacks launched not only by the US, but also from Israel and other neighboring states.  
After watching the US invade Iraq, Iran’s fellow member of the ‘Axis of Evil,’ Iran has credible 
reasons to fear it may be next.  But should Iran developed nuclear capabilities, the US—and any 
other country—would have to think long and hard before launching an attack on Iran, and 
consider the possibility of nuclear retaliation.  After all, one bomb is enough to do serious 
damage to Israel.  Part of the nuclear club of the Middle East, Iran would be a force to be 
reckoned with, and would be able to counter the threats of foreign powers, both inside and out of 
its region. 
73  This has its roots in Persian culture, which 
Iranians see as a previously great, ancient civilization, which has been victimized for years by 
foreign powers.74  The distrust the west feels towards Iran’s nuclear power program is mirrored 
by the Persian people, who see this western opposition as “discriminatory.”75
                                                 
72 David Morgan, “New U.S. Carrier in Gulf a Reminder to Iran: Gates,” Reuters, 30 April 2008 
  Suffocating Iran’s 
nuclear program is just another way of keeping Iran on the west’s leash, and stopping it from 
reaching its full potential.  Scott Sagan alludes to this search for national pride as a driving force 
behind the quest for nuclear weapons, deeming it the norms model. He argues that military 
capabilities, such as nuclear weapons, make up “part of what modern states believe they have to 
73 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian Studies, 39: 3, 307-327, 323 
74 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian Studies, 39: 3, 307-327, 323 
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possess to be legitimate, modern states.”76  Harkening back to the ancient civilization of Persia, 
Iran seems fixated on nuclear technology as a status symbol which will allow it to recapture 
some of the international legitimacy it has lost since the 1979 revolution.  After announcing 
Iran’s plans to enrich uranium in February 2010, Pres. Ahmadinejad was quick to proclaim that 
“Iran was a ‘nuclear state’,”77
 
 indicating the symbolic importance possessing nuclear weapons 
holds for Iran.   
Conclusion 
International efforts to derail Iran’s nuclear program have consistently failed since their 
genesis in 2006.  Iran is resolute in its pursuit of its “inalienable”78 right to enrich uranium, for 
the peaceful purposes of power generation.  A signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran 
does have substantial legal backing for this right, as the NPT guarantees to all participants the 
right to “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.”79
 
  While Iran maintains its program is 
peaceful, the international community is skeptical and doubts that Iran, with bountiful stores of 
oil and natural gas buried beneath its land, is pursuing uranium enrichment for the sole purpose 
of powering its cities.  Unless the international community implements newer, more effective 
techniques to deter Iran from developing nuclear technologies, Iran’s entry into the nuclear club 
seems all but inevitable. 
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Chapter II: China’s Intersecting Interests Abroad 
 
 China is a growing nation with interests spread across many different areas of the world. 
There are a number of countries with whom it is in China’s best interest to maintain a friendly, if 
not cooperative relationship, none more so than the US.  Chinese cooperation with Iran, 
meanwhile, often interferes with other countries’ agendas, and can cause tension in other 
important relationships.  In this context, cooperating with Iran brings with it numerous 
complications for China 
 
“Peaceful Rise” 
 Contemporary Chinese doctrine on foreign policy has been informed by its pursuit of a 
peaceful rise.  Following this course of action, China has aimed to “develop economically by 
taking advantage of the peaceful international environment, and at the same time maintain and 
contribute to world peace by its development.”80  China has aimed to increase its power, 
economically and politically, and increase its influence abroad, but not “at the cost of any other 
country.”81  While avoiding conflict with other countries, maintaining peaceful relations with its 
neighbors has been key goal of the peaceful rise strategy.  Another aspect of the doctrine dictates 
that China must “build a supportive international environment for its ascendancy,”82 to assure the 
international community that it has no dangerous intentions.  In turn, China has implemented a 
foreign policy entailing “seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation with the U.S.,”83
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increasing its ties with other Asian Pacific nations,84 and by creating certain “strategic 
partnerships with the second-tier powers”85
 China has chosen to deepen and develop its Iran policy within its larger effort to promote 
its peaceful rise.  This complicates matters for China.  Viewed as a dangerous and subversive 
power by the West, the US discourages nearly all countries from cooperating with Iran.  
Moreover, the numerous rounds of UN sanctions imposed on Iran over its illicit nuclear program 
have made it more difficult for countries to carry out business with Iran, as part of the US’s 
strategy to keep Iran isolated from the global community.  Nevertheless, China continues to 
cooperate with Iran in numerous fields.  Although the potential for valuable rewards exists with 
Iranian cooperation, China has numerous other foreign policy goals it must consider 
simultaneously. 
 such as India and Russia.   
 
The US-China Economic Relationship 
 The Chinese-American economic relationship is of crucial interest to Beijing.  In 2008, 
China was the “largest source of US imports”86 and total trade between the two countries hit 
“$409 billion.”87  China is now the “third largest export market”88 for US goods, and became 
China’s largest trading partner in 2009.89  The US imported $295,544.5 million90
                                                 
84 Xia, “’China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise’ of China?,” www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html 
 worth of 
Chinese goods in 2009, and these imports played a large role in helping China weather the 
financial crisis of 2008.  Maintaining this trade relationship is thus essential to Chinese interests, 
as without the heavy volume of commerce between it and the US, it is impossible for China’s 
85 Xia, “’China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise’ of China?,” www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html 
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economy to keep growing, as “Exports account for 35% of China’s GDP.”91   Additionally, 
manufactured goods such as power generation equipment, apparel, toys, and furniture, made up 
over 70%92
China’s “top priority is development,”
 of US imports in 2009.  The US demand for Chinese manufactured goods is thus 
responsible for employing millions of Chinese workers.  Were the trade between the US and 
China to decrease, Chinese factories would inevitably be forced to lay off workers as production 
declined, and China could face an unemployment crisis.  Thus, while maintaining the high 
volume of trade with the US is an economic goal for the Chinese, it also is a political one, as 
keeping its citizens employed is essential to their prosperity, and in turn the political stability of 
the country.   
93  and to maintain its recent rapid rate of economic 
growth, it must continue to deepen its trade ties with the US.  Furthermore, following the 
economic crisis of late 2008, China’s crucial role in the success of the global economy was made 
clear.  At the G-20 summit held in the spring of 2009, China was viewed as the “solution to a 
host of problems,”94 such as helping to acquire international debt and helping to stabilize global 
demand.  China cannot not reverse the crisis on its own, however, and its economic fortunes 
remain “deeply entangled with those of the United States, its biggest customer.”95  A high 
priority, then, of Beijing, is “getting America back on its economic feet,”96
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 and ensuring that its 
biggest market recovers to its previously healthy state.  China needs the US to thrive 
economically just as much as the global market needs China’s help to reverse the recession. 
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Fueling the Fire: Iranian Oil 
Another priority high on the agenda of the Chinese government is attaining energy 
security, and through cooperation with Iran, Beijing can work towards achieving just that.  
China’s rapidly expanding economy and infrastructure are beginning to strain its energy 
resources, and current Chinese policy has pegged energy security as a key objective.  Coal is 
responsible for supplying 70% of China’s energy needs (electrical and industrial primarily), and 
this is projected to increase over the next 20 years.97  Oil, on the other hand, as of 2006, was the 
source of 20% of China’s energy needs.98  Nonetheless, Chinese “oil consumption has 
accelerated”99 in recent years due to a sharp increase in private automobile use; estimates state 
that “by year 2010 China is expected to have 90 times more cars than in 1990,”100 and its oil 
demand will thus skyrocket.  Although coal supplies an overwhelming majority of China’s 
energy consumption, the “Chinese government’s energy policies are dominated by the country’s 
growing demand for oil and its reliance on oil imports.”101  Since “Imported crude oil accounted 
for 52 percent of the country's total oil consumption”102 in 2009, it comprised 10% of China’s 
overall energy usage.  Nevertheless, since by 2030 its oil needs could match those of the US,103  
China is “stepping up the search for overseas energy sources in order to ensure energy supply for 
its economic development.”104
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  Iran is a perfect match for China’s energy needs, as it is 
possesses natural energy resources China will desperately need in the near future.   
98 “China Energy Data, Background,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Background.html 
99 Gal Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market,” http://www.iags.org/china.htm 
100 Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market,” http://www.iags.org/china.htm 
101 “China Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis: Oil,” Energy Information Administration 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Oil.html 
102 Wang Qian, “Oil Imports Hit Alarming Level in China: Study,” China Daily, 14 January 2010 
103 Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market,” http://www.iags.org/china.htm 
104 Liang Youyong, “PRC-Iran North Pars Gas Field Talks Unhampered by US 'Interference',” Guoji Xianqu 
Daobao, 24 May 2008 
 24 
Iran holds the world’s second highest amount of natural gas reserves105 and the world’s 
third largest oil reserves,106 but its resources have been largely untapped due to US sanctions and 
discouragement of foreign investment.  With many western countries reluctant to engage in 
business with Iran, China is the first foreign power to have invested to such an extent in Iran’s oil 
industry since the Islamic revolution in 1979.  Chinese oil companies have heavily engaged Iran 
in recent years.  In 2007, Sinopec signed a “$2 billion agreement on developing the Yadavaran 
oil field.”107   The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) engaged in business with Iran 
in June of 2009, signing “a $5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field,”108 which 
came on the heels of the signature of a “$1.76 billion agreement”109 to develop the North 
Azadegan oil field in January.  Then, in September of 2009, it signed a “memorandum of 
understanding for the development of the south Azadegan Oil Field.”110  Finally, in 2009 the 
Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. signed an “agreement […] to develop Iran’s North Pars gas 
project, committing itself to initial drilling.”111
Chinese oil and gas companies are, however, entering cautiously into the Persian oil 
industry.  Although China and Iran have signed numerous deals and memorandums of 
understanding, their firmness is questionable.  Sinopec, regarding its $2 billion dollar deal to 
develop the Yadavaran oilfield in 2007, “appeared to be seeking to keep the agreement low 
key,”
   
112
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 and failed to even officially announce the signature of the lucrative deal.  Likewise, 
when asked to comment on the reported signature of the memorandum of understanding to 
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develop the South Azadegan oil field in August of 2009, the CNPC “declined to comment.”113  
Moreover, a memorandum of understanding is merely a “document signed by two organizations 
to say that they are willing to work together,”114 and is traditionally not legally binding, which 
indicates the CNPC is hesitant to sign a firmer contract. Chinese oil companies tend to sign 
“agreements for projects in which they have no intention of making substantial investments”115 
until potential risks to the investments, such as UN sanctions, are reduced.  This is evidenced by 
the fact that the 2007 Sinopec deal in Yadavaran was only finalized after a 2007 UN report 
showed Iran had stopped work on its nuclear weapons program, which significantly reduced “the 
risks for Sinopec.”116
Nonetheless, this recent burst in activity demonstrates the extent to which Chinese oil 
companies are eager to exploit Iranian oil.  Although the agreements may fall through, that they 
were reached in the first place exhibits the alignment of interests the Chinese and Iranians 
currently share.  Should they be carried out, the plans to extract Iranian oil would be mutually 
beneficial to both countries, as China will have found a source for its energy needs, and Iran will 
receive much needed direct foreign investment in its core industry.  Iran, although in possession 
of plentiful amounts of natural resources, still uses outdated methods in extracting the oil and 
  Aware of the possibility of financial losses, Chinese petroleum companies 
seem to only firmly commit to these agreements once they are confident they will not sustain 
financial losses.  China is thus hedging its bets when dealing with Iran’s energy sector, wary of 
the potential damage it could sustain as a result of its involvement with a country so scrutinized 
by the international community. 
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natural gas, due to a “combination of war, limited investment, sanctions, and a high rate of 
natural decline in Iran’s mature oil fields.”117  In fact, Iran’s exports could “decrease to zero”118
Ironically, Iran is a net fuel importer, importing “40 percent of its gasoline to meet 
domestic demand because of a lack of refining capacity,”
 
by 2015 if its extracting capabilities are not upgraded.  Iran, then, could benefit just as much, if 
not more than China, as a product of these agreements. 
119 which adds even more value to the 
Chinese aid in oil refineries.  One of the key vulnerabilities Iran faces with regard to UN 
sanctions is efforts to cut off its gasoline supply, which could prove to cripple even further the 
already floundering Persian economy.  China could thus be a key ally for Iran insofar as it can 
contribute to Iran becoming energetically autarkic, which could prove to be key in maintaining 
the ineffectiveness of UN sanctions against its nuclear program.  UN sanctions against Iranian 
imports of gasoline have, up until now, not been imposed, but the US has passed legislation 
allowing Pres. Obama to “levy sanctions on energy companies that directly provide gasoline to 
Iran.”120
Recently, Iran has begun to court Chinese oil companies in search of investments in its 
oil refining industry.  In the past, China has invested in Iranian refining capabilities.  Between 
2000 and 2003, Sinopec, sponsored the upgrading of Tehran and Tabriz refineries, a deal worth 
  Should Iran become immune to the threat of a gasoline imports cut-off, it would disarm 
a major weapon in the cache of the international community, and help to ensure its ability to 
pursue its nuclear program in defiance of foreign opposition. 
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an estimated $150 million.121  As part of this sponsoring, Sinopec paid for two refining unit 
revamps122 at Iranian refineries located in Tehran and Tabriz.  More recently, in late 2009, 
Iranian media reported Sinopec also signed a memorandum of understanding under which China 
would “provide financing of $6.5 billion for oil refinery projects in Iran.”123  Earlier in 2009, 
meanwhile, Iran began “calling on China to get involved in several oil projects worth more than 
$42.8 billion in a bid to boost [its] crude oil refining capacity and expand bilateral economic 
relations,”124  and according to the Iranian Oil ministry, an unsigned agreement under which the 
Chinese would “invest about $40 billion in refining Iranian gasoline”125 was reached.  
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether any concrete results have, or ever will develop as a product of 
these reported agreements between China and Iran.  Firstly, the $40 billion agreement announced 
by the Iranian Oil Ministry in July 2009 was never actually confirmed by the Chinese 
government,126
Notwithstanding, it is unlikely the agreements detailed by the Iranian press agencies are 
complete fabrications, and it is probable that negotiations regarding such deals have taken place.  
The lack of a Chinese mention of or response to such news is, once again, most likely due to the 
 while Sinopec’s signing of the $6.5 billion MOU received no mention in the 
Chinese press.  More importantly, however, is the fact that that the signatures of these 
agreements have been reported exclusively in the Iranian media.  Iran would logically like to 
exaggerate the firmness of the agreements it has reportedly reached with the Chinese in order to 
create the illusion that it is prospering despite the international community’s efforts to stifle it;  
any deals reported exclusively from within Iran thus must be considered with this bias in mind. 
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caution China is exhibiting with regards to their investments in the Iranian oil industry.  It 
appears that just as Chinese oil companies are acting cautiously in extracting Iranian oil, they are 
also acting cautiously in aiding Iran to refine it.  China, through updating Iran’s refining 
technology, could “literally keep Iran's factories, homes and cars — in effect, a nation of 66 
million people — running”127
The motives for Chinese involvement in the Iranian oil industry are not clear.  At present, 
the oil and gas produced through these deals will be “sold on the open market”
 should sanctions against fuel imports ever be imposed.  Aware of 
these far reaching consequences which could result from its investment in the Iranian oil refining 
industry, China is exerting caution in its investments, ensuring it does not become entangled in 
plans it may later regret.   
128 and will thus 
enhance the “global supply”129 by adding previously untapped oil to the world market.  For now, 
China has no plans to exclusively consume the oil itself is producing, but this may be because 
they do not need it yet.  The US and other western countries nonetheless fear that China is 
‘locking up’ oil resources in Iran, and will eventually become the exclusive consumer of such 
oil.  Chinese oil consumption is forecasted to match that of the US by 2030,130 and it is unlikely 
that China would continue to sell Iranian oil internationally should it encounter shortages in its 
own supply; Chinese media itself recognizes that “With footholds in Iran, China can diversify its 
oil supplies to enhance energy security.”131
Of course, Chinese oil companies could simply be exploiting Iran’s untapped oil 
resources in search of large profits.  After all, oil companies make money by extracting, then 
  In preparation for a future energy crisis, China may 
be staking its claim to Iranian oil.   
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refining and ultimately selling oil on the world market.  Chinese companies may be taking 
advantage of the fact that western countries are hesitant to deal with Iran, and for the simple 
motive of making a profit, have become so deeply involved in tapping Iranian oil.  Nonetheless, 
this ambiguity of motives gives further credence to the fact that the Chinese government is still 
acting cautiously, and determining the best course of action to follow with regard to developing 
Iranian oil fields.  Hesitant to commit too much too soon, Chinese oil companies, at this point, 
are “eager to get their foot in Iran's door,”132
 
 while still wary of stepping on the international 
community’s toes. 
Fueling the Economy: Iran as a Market 
Apart from oil deals, other economic activity between China and Iran has intensified in 
recent years.  In May of 2009, Tehran hosted a conference on Chinese-Iranian economic ties, in 
which Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki requested that China begin “facilitating 
further trade relations, removing present obstacles on the way of Iran-China trade ties as well as 
removing customs tariffs.”133  At the meeting, attended by over “700 Iranian and Chinese 
businessmen from both private and public sectors,”134 he pointed out Iran’s “satisfactory amount 
of capital available for the Iranian and Chinese businessmen, modern technologies and skillful 
labor force,”135
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 which combine to create many opportunities for development.  Mottaki appealed 
to China’s wallet, knowing that sustaining economic growth is one of China’s main political 
goals.  Indeed, China could profit greatly from greater investment in and trade with Iran, and 
seems to recognize this fact, demonstrated by the record levels of trade reached between the two 
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countries in 2008 and 2009.  Total trade between Iran and China in 2009, including business 
channeled through the UAE totaled $36.5 billion, which could be “more than with the entire EU 
bloc,”136
 
 and would make China Iran’s top trading partner.  Trade between Tehran and Beijing is 
increasing to record levels year after year, and shows no sign of slowing.  The Iranian economy, 
largely isolated from the west, has proven to be a potent export market for China, aiding the 
Chinese economy to continue growing despite the global recession. 
A Means to Power: Political Gains 
Another potential benefit China may enjoy as a result of Iranian cooperation is reduced 
US influence in the Middle East.  With no end of the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan in 
sight, the dominance of the US in the Middle East seems likely to continue for many years to 
come.  China, meanwhile is “far from comfortable”137 with this US dominance, and perhaps 
views that through a stronger Iran, this US regional hegemony could be challenged to an extent.  
Since China perceives Iran as a regional “putative power,”138 with the potential to become a 
heavyweight in the region, it perhaps would like to see Iran grow enough to potentially challenge 
this US dominance, and begin the process of pushing the US out of the Middle East.  China 
worries that the US is trying to “take advantage of its hegemonic standing to consolidate control 
over hydrocarbon resources,”139
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energy cooperation in the Islamic Republic, but also through political means.  If Middle Eastern 
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states have to worry about not only the US, but another regional power—Iran—they may have to 
think twice about who they obey.  Moreover, if Iran were to become a regional leader, China 
would certainly prefer to “enjoy a relationship”140
Furthermore, a stronger Iran would necessitate more US care in dealing with the Middle 
East.  The US would need to dedicate more resources and more time pursuing its goals in the 
region if Iran were to go nuclear.  Through strengthening Iran, China may be creating a 
“’strategic diversion’ to keep U.S. interests focused on the Middle East rather than on the 
problems in China’s own backyard.”
 and the fruits of such a bond with Iran and the 
rest of the region.  If China were responsible for helping Iran attain its newfound status as a 
regional leader, it would likely enjoy a position of favor with Iran.  Having a political ally in this 
newly strengthened Iran, China would have much more influence in the Middle East, and would 
thus have greater access to and control over its energy resources—much like the US enjoys 
today.  
141
 
  In order to avoid spreading itself too thin, the US will 
eventually have to prioritize its foreign policy, and China hopes that this reprioritization will 
result in diminished US involvement in the East Asia region.  Perhaps through strengthening 
Iran, or at least preventing it from being weakened, China is looking to distract the US from the 
East Asia region in order to achieve its own agenda. 
Western Reaction 
Western countries, and the US in particular, have taken a defensive stance regarding 
cooperation between China and Iran.  In May of 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned 
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that China and Iran had made “quite disturbing gains in Latin America”142 and warned of their 
consequences.  Many were perplexed that “Clinton would group the countries together,”143
China and Iran, meanwhile, have resisted western disapproval of the deepening of their 
ties.  While reporting news of recent oil deals, the Chinese media made it clear that cooperation 
between itself and Iran was increasing, and that it would continue to do so regardless of US 
complaints.  State run press agencies stressed the fact that once an oil field development deal in 
2008 was signed, “cooperation between China and the Mideast energy source power Iran will 
take a further step forward.”
 but it 
could be an indication of the US beginning to notice the mutual interests the two countries share, 
and the genesis of plans to derail the plans Iran and China may have to capitalize on such 
interests. 
144  Moreover, they noted that “as happens with other countries 
hoping to develop the Iranian energy source market, this normal commercial activity of China 
has encountered US interference.”145  Chinese Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao denounced the US 
for interfering and voicing its opposition, claiming that “United States should not influence or 
damage the countries concerned in carrying out normal economic and energy source cooperation 
with Iran.”146 Iranian media echoed these sentiments, stating that the US led sanctions imposed 
in March of 2008 would have “no influence on gas deals between Iran and China.”147
Moreover, in October of 2009, not long after Iran came under western fire for its illicit 
nuclear activities, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would “maintain high-
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level exchanges with Iran, enhance mutual understanding and trust, promote bilateral pragmatic 
cooperation and coordinate closely in international affairs.”148
 
  In direct defiance of the West, 
China appears to be beginning to out rightly cooperate more and more with Iran, demonstrating a 
newfound confidence in the Chinese government, and less of a willingness to be intimidated by 
the West.   
Conclusion 
As time goes by, China will be presented with more and more opportunities to cooperate 
with Iran, and undoubtedly more and more resistance attempting to stop this from happening.  
Only time will tell how deep Chinese and Iranian cooperation will go, but nascent Chinese 
confidence on pursuing its own foreign policy goals in defiance of US demands indicates 
cooperation could intensify to much higher levels.  Iran is eager to have a powerful country step 
up and invest in its oil resources, while China is more than happy to cooperate with a potential 
energy ally.  Both appear steadfast in continuing to work together despite US opposition. 
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Chapter III: Chinese Actions in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear 
Program 
It is within the context of China’s numerous interests abroad which Chinese-Iranian 
cooperation takes place.  Although China can clearly reap numerous benefits through developing 
ties with Iran, the Iranian nuclear program complicates the extent to which China can deepen its 
relationship with Iran.  Nonetheless, China has developed a strategy to deal with this political 
dilemma, and through analyzing its behavior in the UN Security Council, the course of action 
China is following becomes clear. 
 
China’s Previous Choice 
China was one of the original contributors to the Iranian nuclear program.  In the 1980’s 
and 1990’s it helped in “training Iranian nuclear technicians in China under a secret nuclear 
cooperation agreement, assisted in the construction of Iran's primary research facility, located at 
Isfahan, and also agreed to supply Iran with subcritical or zero yield nuclear reactors.”149  
Further, from 1985-1997, China was Iran’s “main nuclear partner,”150 and even defended itself 
on numerous occasions, citing that the Iranian program was peaceful and transparent.151  During 
this period Russia also significantly aided Iran’s nuclear program.  The Iranian government was 
active in “recruiting and paying Russian scientists to provide them with assistance in their 
nuclear program.”152  Russians are believed to have been “paid hard currency [in return for] for 
aid in weapons and technical programs,”153
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Russia helped Iran build and supply fuel for a nuclear reactor,154 and established partnerships 
with Iranian scientists “in the field of nuclear and ballistic weapons.”155
International pressure continued to mount, however, throughout the 1990’s, and 
eventually China had no choice but to give in to international, or more accurately, US, demands 
to halt nuclear aid to Iran.  Although all cooperation between China and Iran during this time was 
“within the letter of the NPT regime,”
  Combined, China and 
Russia have aided immensely the development of the Iranian nuclear program. 
156 Iran was running a covert nuclear operation, and 
evidence began to accumulate indicating that it was weapons-focused.  China, fearing that its 
international reputation could take a serious hit should it be found responsible for allowing Iran 
to go nuclear, in 1997 began to “disengage”157
This decision to limit support to the Iranian nuclear program was the product of several 
factors.  Firstly, it was part of a fundamental “shift in Chinese thinking about the global 
nonproliferation regime.”
 its aid to Iran’s nuclear program.   
158  China now aimed to limit the number of nuclear states in the world, 
instead of attempting to increase them.  More importantly, however, was China’s need to protect 
its relationship with the US.  In 1996-7 the US and China engaged in what was deemed a “global 
security dialogue,” and as a result of these negotiations Chinese support for the Iranian nuclear 
program nearly vanished completely.  The US used “a variety of disincentives to coerce China to 
limit and eventually end all nuclear trade with Iran.”159  Members of Congress “repeatedly raised 
the possibility of revoking China’s most-favored-nation status,”160
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sanctions on two Chinese companies who helped “Iran make chemical weapons.”161  Eventually, 
China gave in to US demands.  In a letter from foreign minister Qian Qichen to then US 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Qian promised to “forgo any and all future cooperation 
with Iran,”162 and cancelled many deals already in progress with Iran.163  At this point, 
“maintaining comity in Sino-American relations outweighed its interests in Tehran,”164 and 
China was forced to pick one side over the other.  China needed to “find a balance between 
competing foreign policy priorities,”165
 
 and during the 1990’s ensuring positive relations with 
the US simply outweighed its interests in Iran. 
Satisfying Everyone: China’s Behavior in the Security Council 
An examination of recent Chinese behavior in the Security Council suggests that it has 
been attempting to play both sides of the field, appeasing US demands while simultaneously 
aiding Tehran.  Since 2006, China has supported UN sanctions against Iran numerous times.  
After the US made it clear that it was “time for China to agree with Britain, France, Germany 
and the US on a sanctions resolution,”166 it voted for sanctions on Iran in 2006, which imposed a 
“travel ban and asset freeze on Iranian officials and institutions connected with the country's 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs.”167
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  Interestingly, Chinese ambassador Wang Guangya 
attempted to spin this potentially damaging move to China’s relations with Iran by highlighting 
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relevant resolutions of the Security Council and meets the requirement of the IAEA, the Security 
Council shall suspend and even terminate the sanction measures.”168
In the months leading up to the implementation of the first round of sanctions in 2006, 
Chinese media reported that “The United States and other western countries are calling for a 
draft UN resolution that would impose sanctions on Iran,”
  Indeed, China seemed 
reluctant to back western efforts.   
169 and was vocal in urging other 
countries to “refrain from taking any action that may lead to the escalation”170 of tensions 
between Iran and the rest of the world.  The Chinese focused on the fact that the West was 
leading the charge for sanctions, thus distancing themselves from the process.  Immediately 
following the first round of sanctions’ approval, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu 
Jianchao made clear to the Iranian press that the Chinese government believes that sanctions 
“cannot be a permanent solution to the problem”171 and downplayed Chinese support for 
sanctions by emphasizing China’s willingness to explore “political and diplomatic efforts to 
peacefully solve the Iran nuclear question by talks.”172
In late 2007, when Iran refused to suspend its uranium enrichment programs, the US 
called for another round of sanctions.  China, however, was reticent.  UN envoy Wang Guangya 
stated that regarding additional sanctions, the UN “must be careful.”
  China not only attempted to cooperate 
with Iran before sanctions were imposed, but it also engaged in political damage control 
following their implementation. 
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“dealt a blow to efforts to raise pressure on Iran over its nuclear program”174  when it refused to 
attend a meeting of the Security Council powers in late 2007.  The US accused China of 
“dragging its feet,”175 while China explained it cancelled due to “technical reasons.”176  But the 
Iranian government took notice, reporting that China “always opposed the US extremist policy 
on Iran's nuclear activities”177 and emphasized that “Chinese leaders think negotiation is the best 
way to resolve disputes over Iranian nuclear program.”178  Nevertheless, the next month, Chinese 
banks began to “refuse loans to Iranian businessmen, amid US pressure to cut business with 
Iran.”179   Then, after further pressure from US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte in 
early 2008,180 China voted for additional sanctions to be imposed in March of 2008.181
 
   
The Russian Factor 
Russia is another key player in the Iranian nuclear saga.  In the past, Russia has supported 
the Iranian nuclear program in a similar capacity to the Chinese, transferring “to Iran technology 
related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.”182  Also, in 1995 Russia signed a deal with 
Iran to build and supervise a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant in the southern Iranian city of 
Bushehr.183
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“power plant in Iran this summer.”184
Russia’s behavior with regard to Iran has also had an influence on Chinese handling of 
the situation.  In the past, China has followed “Russia’s lead in Security Council 
deliberations,”
  Simultaneously, Russia has directly engaged Iran 
attempting to derail Tehran’s interests in uranium enrichment, playing a key role in the IAEA 
agreement proposed in November 2009 by volunteering to enrich uranium on Iran’s behalf, and 
has previously supported sanctions on Iran.   
185 and at times the powers have worked as a team.  For example, in September of 
2009, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was quoted as stating that “sanctions are 
inevitable,”186 while China made similar allusions to its inability to keep Iran from being 
punished by other powers, stating that if the solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is through 
nonpolitical, or military means, China would be unable to “stop such [a] military attack."187
A divergence in action between Russia and China has nonetheless appeared recently.  
Although Foreign Minister Lavrov declared in October 2009 that regarding Iran, “at the current 
stage, all forces should be thrown at supporting the negotiating process,”
  
Russia and China seem to have been playing good cop-bad cop with Iran; reminding Iran of the 
potential threat of sanctions and military strikes that comes from the West, while not actually 
making it.  It has been convenient for China that Russia has also put the brakes on sanctions in 
the past, as this has helped to disguise Chinese support for Iran.  Having Russia on its side on the 
Iran issue has given China much stronger leverage, while simultaneously diminishing the risk it 
takes by being outspoken against western powers.  
188
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“Threats, sanctions and threats of pressure in the current situation (…) would be 
counterproductive,”189 after Tehran failed to accept the proposed IAEA agreement to enrich 
uranium abroad in November of 2009, Russia openly accepted the possibility of imposing stricter 
sanctions on Iran.190  Furthermore, according to US ambassador to Russia John Beyrle, the 
position of Washington and Moscow regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions “have never been so 
near”191 and the two powers agree that neither need “a nuclear arms race” in the region.192  
Russia has become more sympathetic to US initiatives against Iran’s nuclear program following 
“President Obama's decision to abandon a Bush-era plan for a missile defense system in 
Europe”193 which helped “ease a simmering rift”194 between the two powers.  This recent 
alignment of US and Russian foreign policy is exemplified further by the announcement of a 
“U.S.-Russian treaty to reduce long-range nuclear weapons.”195
Russia’s interests in Iran are not identical to China’s, and thus diverging patterns of 
behavior are expected.  Whereas the plentiful oil reserves of Iran are a great incentive for China 
to cooperate with and protect it, Russia is the world’s “second largest oil exporter.”
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to the lure of Persian petroleum, Russia has far fewer reasons to side with Iran when faced with 
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Towards the Future: China Emboldened by the Financial Crisis 
After the economic crisis of 2008, Chinese relations with the US have witnessed a radical 
shift in tone, and Chinese relations with Iran could deepen as a result.  In the past China has 
appeased—albeit with considerable resistance—the US’s wishes with regard to sanctioning Iran 
in the UN Security Council, and has never out rightly challenged the US on Iran.  Nevertheless, 
as a result of the recent changes in dynamics between the two superpowers, changes in Chinese 
behavior have appeared. 
With the US’s strong presence in Asia, the East-Asia region is currently a bipolar system, 
with China and the US as the two great powers.  The US maintains its status as a pole in the 
region with its dominant naval force in the Pacific, making China vulnerable to US naval 
blockades of its major ports.  Nonetheless, in recent years China has begun to develop its navy, 
including “submarines, destroyers and frigates,”197 as well as aircraft carriers.  There are 
numerous goals China could be attempting to accomplish with naval modernization, but it 
appears China mainly wishes to protect its “sea lines of communication to the Persian Gulf,” and 
ultimately “assert its status as a major world power […] and displace U.S. regional military 
influence.”198
Following the economic crisis of late 2008, the United States suffered greatly, while 
China, relatively speaking, emerged unscathed.  China was “not immune to the effects of the 
global financial crisis,”
  China is undoubtedly attempting to hedge against US global dominance.  Building 
up its navy, however, is just one manner in which China is attempting to accomplish this. 
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but the extent to which this damage was done was far less than to the US.  In 2009, China’s GDP 
rose by 8.7%200 compared to 2008, which was well above the growth rate of the US, which saw a 
drop of 2.4% in its GDP in the same period.201  This indicates that China, unlike most of the 
developed world, is “managing to push through the global recession with little damage.”202  As a 
result of the financial crisis, China has a newfound source of leverage over the US.  The US’s 
floundering economy is tied to that of China, and immediately following the crisis in September 
of 2008, President Bush reportedly called China with a plea to “hold even more US Treasury 
bonds and US assets.”203  Additionally, China holds a large number of US securities, a number 
equal to “$1,000 per person in China, a significant figure”204 since Chinese per capita GDP is 
less than $3,400.205  This substantial stake in the future of the US economy has caused provided 
China with “leverage against US policies it opposes.”206
Resulting from its newfound leverage and confidence, China has become less 
compromising on a number of issues, such as Tibet.  On February 18, 2010 President Obama met 
with the Dalai Lama, despite China’s warnings that its “ties with the US would be 
  Additionally, the financial crisis has 
afforded China a large confidence boost.  China has been a rising power for many years, and 
after its essential role in helping the global economy to recover from the financial meltdown, its 
status as a global player has been crystallized.  Aware of its own importance in global affairs, the 
Chinese government has developed a higher level of confidence, which has also contributed to 
its more assertive foreign policy. 
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undermined”207 should a meeting between the two take place.  China, meanwhile, declared that 
the meeting represented an “interference in China’s internal affairs,”208 and directly violated 
China’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”209
Chinese policy towards Taiwan has also changed since the onset of the financial crisis.  
Before the crisis in April of 2008, after speaking with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, 
Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie expressed his “hope that the US side will strictly abide 
by the one-China principle, stick to the three China-US joint communiques, [and] stop arms sales 
to Taiwan.”
  In the past, it has been traditional for US 
presidents to meet with the Dalai Lama, and although China has voiced its disapproval over such 
meetings, it has never before voiced such strong opposition to them.  Now better able to assert its 
interests, China is speaking out and taking action against the US on a number of issues it was 
previously incapable of affecting.   
210  Nevertheless, in late January 2010 President Obama “approved an arms sales 
package to Taiwan worth more than $6 billion,”211 which elicited a much stronger than usual 
reaction from Beijing.  Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu announced that such 
sales “will undoubtedly harm Sino-US relations and create serious negative impact on Sino-US 
relations, and on many areas of exchanges and cooperation between the two countries”212 since 
the continuation of sales “seriously endangers China's state security.”213
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cooperation.”214  This “swift, and negative”215 Chinese response is another example of China’s 
more confident and aggressive behavior.  In April of 2008 China merely expressed “hope”216
In November 2009, after President Obama made a much publicized visit to China, the 
role China plays in US policy became clear. The visit was similar to a “profligate spender 
coming to pay his respects to his banker”
 
that the US would cease arms sales to Taiwan, but now suddenly deems the issue one of national 
security, and predicts serious damage to the Sino-US relationship as a result of the US’s actions.  
China’s current stance on the issue is much more assertive and firm than in 2008.  This abrupt 
change in priorities is a product of the shift in dynamics which has occurred between the US and 
China over the past two years, and demonstrates again that China is asserting its demands more 
aggressively, and giving in to US demands less frequently. 
217 in that Pres. Obama spent less time “exhorting 
Beijing and more time reassuring it.”218  During the visit, Pres. Obama failed to garner Chinese 
support for a number of issues of importance to US foreign policy, including the Iranian nuclear 
issue.  China has also exhibited a hesitance in bending to US pressure on economic issues, 
refusing to “bow to US pressure to revalue its currency”219 in early 2010, an issue on which it 
has capitulated in the past.220  Even with regard to climate change, China has defied the US 
numerous times, resisting “American initiatives on climate change policy.”221
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agreement”222 to reduce carbon emissions.  The US now faces “a fast-rising China more willing 
to say no”223
Unwilling to have its arm twisted, China is more willing to create friction with the US in 
order to achieve its goals.  With regard to Iran, this could mean cooperation deeper than ever 
before.  Iran has become another bargaining chip for China, over the US, it seems.  Although 
days before Pres. Obama’s arrival to the summit with Beijing in November of 2009, Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev conceded to considering tougher sanctions on Iran, Chinese 
President Hu Jiantao did not, marking the importance of dealing with “the Iranian nuclear regime 
through dialogue and negotiations.”
 to its demands, and must play fair with China if it expects to get what it wants.   
224  This is of note, since with Russia considering sanctions, 
China became the only roadblock to their imposition.  Using it as even more leverage over the 
US, cooperation on the Iranian issue is something the US is going to have to earn from China.  In 
fact, after Pres. Obama approved the sale of US arms in 2010 to Taiwan, Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu made a not-so-veiled reference to the impact such a development would 
have on the Iranian nuclear issue when he specifically iterated that “cooperation between China 
and the United States on relevant major international and regional issues will unavoidably be 
impacted.”225  With China “in no mood to cooperate,”226
 
 it appears the US can no longer simply 
make demands of the Chinese and expect action.  Beijing has its own agenda, and the US is 
suddenly far less able to dictate what that agenda entails. 
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The Present Day Situation 
Now more confident and able to push back against US demands on Iran, China has 
managed to help prevent the sanctions imposed on Iran from being effective, and to an extent has 
begun to even undermine them.  At each stage in the sanctions negotiation process, China has 
managed to water down the scope of the sanctions, and contribute to their impotency.  Before the 
imposition of the last round of sanctions in 2008, China was noted for stalling the process, and 
then ultimately agreed only to a “watered down set of sanctions.”227  Then, in late 2009, after a 
new US push for sanctions began, China took an outspoken stance against sanctions.  
Representatives for Beijing asserted that “China always believes that sanctions and pressure 
should not be an option and will not be conducive to the current diplomatic efforts over the Iran 
nuclear issue,”228 indicating a contradiction, as China has supported sanctions numerous times in 
the past.  Beijing went even further, however, and claimed that it was in all parties’ involved best 
interests to solve the dilemma through “peaceful negotiation,”229
Not only was China outspoken on its opposition to sanctions in 2009, but it also became 
much more explicit regarding cooperating with Iran.  On October 15th Chinese Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao held a meeting with Iranian Vice President Mohammed Reza Rahimi, after which he 
emphasized their mutual wish to increase “cooperation between the countries in energy and trade 
and greater coordination in international affairs.”
 reiterating its opposition to 
sanctions.   
230
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  Iranian cooperation is no longer something 
which China seems to be attempting to hide.  During previous sanctions negotiations China 
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rarely acknowledged its deepening ties with Iran.  But in 2009, it openly celebrated the fact that 
“two-way trade between China and Iran grew 35 percent last year [2008], to $27 billion,”231 and 
reached similar levels in 2009.232
Indeed, Chinese opposition to sanctions has never been clearer than now.  After the 
passing of an IAEA resolution on November 27th, 2009, which called for “the full cooperation of 
Iran to clarify all outstanding issues involving its nuclear program,”
  The combination of potential economic and energy 
cooperation combine to make Iran a country from whom China could benefit greatly.  China 
seems to have more to lose, suddenly, if it does not challenge US threats of sanctions, and 
perhaps because of this it is taking a harder stance against them, at least in this stage.  This, 
combined with the fact that China suddenly has gained a source of influence over the US, and for 
the first time can successfully prioritize its own agenda in Iran in opposition to the US’s, make 
Chinese resistance to sanctions ever more predictable. 
233 Chinese Minister Qin 
emphasized the importance of resuming “dialogue and negotiation,”234 and once again showed 
unwillingness to support sanctions.  The agreement, however, also ordered the censuring of Iran, 
and demanded it halt the construction of a recently discovered uranium enrichment plant.235  
Then, after assuming its position of Presidency of the Security Council in January of 2010, China 
“blocked western efforts to impose a fresh round of sanctions”236
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 after Tehran refused to accept a 
UN sponsored deal.  As part of the agreement, “most of Iran's existing low-grade enriched 
uranium would be shipped to Russia and France by the end of [2009], where it would be 
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processed into fuel rods with the purity of 20 percent,”237 in order to allow Iran to produce 
nuclear energy.  White House spokesman Robert Gibbs made clear that “December is "a very 
real deadline" for Iran to "pursue its responsibilities" on the nuclear issue,”238
Then, on January 18 2010, China single handedly “blocked a new round of sanctions 
against the Islamic republic”
 which made 
China’s continued reluctance to support sanctions ever more meaningful.  
239 and, it removed the previous negotiator on Iran, He Yafei, 
without naming a replacement.  Further, in February 2010, after Iran announced it had begun 
uranium “enrichment activities to the purity of 20 percent,”240 US Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates immediately declared that the “only path that is left […] is that pressure track.”241  China, 
meanwhile, quickly declared its hope that “all relevant parties will step up diplomatic efforts and 
make progress in dialogue and negotiations.”242
Finally, in April of 2010, China reportedly “agreed to begin discussions on a possible 
resolution,”
   
243 although UN diplomats warned “protracted negotiations with China over the 
substance”244 were likely.  This final development falls in line with China’s previous behavior in 
the Security Council.  In the past, China has resisted US pressure on sanctions for as long as it 
deemed advantageous.  Since China found “itself isolated in the six-power group as Russia 
reluctantly agreed that a new round of sanctions was necessary,”245
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continuing to resist sanctions on Iran could cause the international community to become 
suspicious of its intentions.  China held out for as long as it could resisting sanctions, but, as it 
has numerous times in the past, it has recognized that continued resistance could be damaging to 
its other relationships, and for that reason has agreed to return to the negotiating table, in a likely 
attempt to dilute the UN sanctions the international community agrees upon. 
 
A Grand Strategy 
China’s behavior in the Security Council raises an important question: why would it be 
opposed to sanctioning Iran for its illicit nuclear activities, if it, in reality, is opposed to the 
Iranian nuclear program?  Numerous explanations are possible, however looking at China’s 
previous behavior regarding sanctions in the UN, it becomes clear that its actions have been 
carefully calculated.  Although it has supported sanctions three times previously, and now looks 
likely to support a fourth round, it only did so after the original proposals “had been watered 
down and after Russia”246 also signed off on them. Furthermore, that China now is open to 
negotiating sanctions on Iran, after nearly 2 years of stalling, indicates China simply wishes to 
postpone and subsequently curtail any damages to Iran.  China has been, and continues to try to 
find a happy medium “between Iran and the United States,”247 in an attempt to keep both sides 
pleased.  As long as China eventually votes for sanctions, the US will be relatively happy, and if 
China can make sanctions “limited,”248
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 potential damage to Iran will be curtailed.  For example, 
after the proposed UN agreement in which third party countries would enrich uranium for Iran, 
China supported the agreement.  This ensured the US was satisfied, but when Iran failed to 
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western efforts to impose sanctions on Iran gains China credibility with the Iranians, while its 
ultimate capitulation and approval of sanctions maintains comity with western powers.  A 
seemingly inconsistent pattern of behavior in China is anything but; the apparent contradictions 
in policy are part of a calculated effort to play both sides of the field, and maintain positive 
relations with the US and Iran simultaneously. 
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Conclusion: Towards a New World Order? 
Chinese-Iranian cooperation is poised to deepen in the recent future, and the effects on 
the international political landscape could be profound.  Following the financial crisis of 2008, 
China is acting more boldly in pursuit of achieving the interests it deems important.  On 
numerous occasions, whether in the Security Council, or simply in the press, China has taken 
concrete steps in the international community in order to support Iran.  In contrast to the US, 
China sees Iran “not as a threat but a potential ally;”249 leading Chinese scholar Francois 
Godemet states it best: “the rise of Iran is not bad news for China.”250
In the past, China has played a key role in nuclear weapons proliferation.  It has been 
widely reported that “China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear 
infrastructure”
  A nuclear Iran would be 
of much greater consequence to western powers, namely the US, than to China herself, and 
China seems to be aware of this, as through diluting and postponing UN sanctions ever since 
2006, China has helped to undermine UN efforts to derail Iran’s nuclear program.   
251 and was critical to the successful Pakistani development of nuclear weapons.  
AQ Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who led the country’s nuclear program, disclosed that 
the “Chinese gave [Pakistan] drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave [Pakistan] kg50 enriched 
uranium,”252 providing a “virtual do-it-yourself kit that significantly speeded Pakistan's bomb 
effort.”253  Chinese scientists exchanged information with Pakistani scientists aiding in 
“furthering Pakistan’s efforts to improve its nuclear-weapons designs.”254
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Pakistan, as this could severely strain the US-Chinese relationship, it can work against 
international efforts aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.  By watering down 
sanctions year after year, it seems that China is doing just that.   
China has previously benefited from nuclear proliferation, in that Pakistan’s development 
of nuclear capabilities has prevented India from being able to dominate south Asia completely, 
and from rivaling China.  Perhaps China thinks it could benefit once again, in the case of Iran.  If 
Iran were to get the bomb, US power in the Middle East would be severely challenged, and its 
influence in the region thus reduced.  This would greatly aid China’s goal to cut US influence 
across the globe.   
Nurturing its relationship with Iran in order to secure a future source of oil also appears to 
be high on the list of Chinese priorities, and due to its newfound confidence and economic 
leverage over the US, China is able to do so with less fear of US disapproval.  Although the 
overwhelming source of China’s energy is coal, which makes up “70 percent of China’s total 
primary energy consumption,”255
Finally, in Iran, China may have found the distraction it needs to remove the US from its 
own backyard.  Brazen and confident after its status as a world power was cemented following 
the 2008 financial crisis, China appears to be capitalizing on the moment of vulnerability the US 
is currently experiencing.  By undermining US efforts to isolate Iran through increasing trade 
and investing in the Iranian oil industry, China is complicating US foreign policy in the Middle 
  China is clearly thinking ahead.  While it does not currently 
need Iranian oil, in the not-so-distant future it may find itself pressed to produce more oil due to 
skyrocketing demand.  Through the numerous agreements with Iranian oil companies, China 
may have found the energy source it needs to keep its lights turned on.   
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East.  For China, the emergence of Iran as a regional power is a “positive development toward 
the evolution of a multipolar international system.”256
A nuclear Iran is one of the greatest fears of many world powers, but it seems that for 
China, such a situation could bring about positive results.  While increased tensions in the 
Middle East—which would almost assuredly result from the Iranian construction of a nuclear 
bomb—are never a good thing, China has few entanglements in the region, and could benefit 
from such regional strife.  By increasing ties with Iran, and promoting favorable relations with 
Tehran, China seems to be preparing for the post-nuclear Iran world. 
  By supporting Iran through increased 
economic and political cooperation, China seems to be attempting to accelerate the development 
of this new distribution of power. 
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